Relaxed Multiple Routing Configurations:  
IP Fast Reroute for Single and Correlated Failures

Tarik Ćičić†*, Audun Fosselie Hansen§, Amund Kvalbein*, Matthias Hartmann†,  
Rüdiger Martin†, Michael Menth†, Stein Gjessing‡ and Olav Lysne‡  
* Simula Research Laboratory, Martin Linges vei 17, N-1331 Fornebu, Norway  
† University of Würzburg, Institute of Computer Science, Am Hubland, D-97074 Würzburg, Germany  
s Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, Gausdalelléen 23, N-0371 Oslo, Norway  
§ Telenor Research and Innovation, Snarøyveien 30, N-1331 Fornebu, Norway

Abstract—Multi-topology routing is an increasingly popular IP network management concept that allows transport of different traffic types over disjoint network paths. The concept is of particular interest for implementation of IP fast reroute (IP FRR). The authors have previously proposed an IP FRR scheme based on multi-topology routing called Multiple Routing Configurations (MRC). MRC supports guaranteed, instantaneous recovery from any single link or node failure in biconnected networks as well as from many combined failures, provided sufficient bandwidth on the surviving links. Furthermore, in MRC different failures result in routing over different network topologies, which gives good control of the traffic distribution in the networks after a failure.

In this paper we present two contributions. First we define an enhanced IP FRR scheme which we call “relaxed MRC” (rMRC). Through experiments we demonstrate that rMRC is an improvement over MRC in all important aspects. Resource utilization in the presence of failures is significantly better, both in terms of path lengths and in terms of load distribution between the links. The requirement to internal state in the routers is reduced as rMRC requires fewer backup topologies to provide the same degree of protection. In addition to this, the preprocessing needed to generate the backup topologies is simplified. The second contribution is an extension of rMRC that can provide fast reroute in the presence of multiple correlated failures. Our evaluations demonstrate only a small penalty in path lengths and in the number of backup topologies required.

Index Terms—IP fast reroute, multi-topology routing, network protection, network utilization, correlated failures, shared risk groups.

I. INTRODUCTION

When there is a connectivity failure or a topological change in a network, traditional intra-domain routing protocols like OSPF or IS-IS respond by triggering a network-wide re-convergence. Information about the failure is broadcast in the network, and all routers in the domain independently calculate a new valid routing table upon receiving the notification. This is a time-consuming process that typically involves a period of instability and invalid routing in the network [1], [2]. The time-scale of this re-convergence process has been significantly reduced with modern routers [3]. However, this is still not acceptable for emerging time-critical Internet applications with stringent demands on network availability.

A number of mechanisms for faster failure handling have been proposed for both MPLS [4] and connectionless IP networks [5]–[9]. These mechanisms compute alternate routes in advance, which are immediately ready for use by the node that detects the failure. Such mechanisms have two attractive properties. First, they respond quickly to a failure and prevent packet loss by allowing packet forwarding to continue on alternate routes while the routing protocol converges on the new topology. Second, they allow routers to delay the sending of a failure notification for a period of time while relying on the available repair path. This way, short-lived failures can be handled without triggering a global re-convergence. A large percentage of experienced network failures are short-lived [10], and handling such failures locally can improve network stability.

Multi-topology (MT) routing is a powerful traffic engineering and network management concept based on introducing multiple logical topologies in the network. Each logical topology is used to route a special class of the network traffic, identifiable from the packet header. For example, multicast or high-priority DiffServ traffic could be routed separately from the remaining traffic. The IP community has recently shown a strong interest in this concept, and the standardization process has recently been completed [11], [12].

Multi-topology routing is well suited for implementation of fast local recovery in connectionless IP networks [13]. The authors have proposed Multiple Routing Configurations (MRC, [9]) as a fast reroute scheme based on MT routing. MRC uses the logical topologies as “backup” topologies that, when a failure is encountered, do not use the failed component (link or node) for routing. These backup topologies are created so that for each component exists a backup topology not using this component for routing [9]. In general, for a node detecting a component failure (i.e., loss of signal to one of its neighbors) it is hard to know whether the neighbor node or the connecting link is broken. MRC guarantees recovery from any single link or node failure in biconnected networks, without requiring explicit knowledge about the underlying failure. If the available bandwidth on the surviving links is sufficient, all
traffic can be delivered to its destination.

In MRC, link-failure protection requires every link to be excluded from routing in one of the backup topologies. Such links are said to be “isolated” in this topology, and their weight is set to infinity. A typical backup topology has many isolated links, which constrains the routing of recovered traffic.

In this paper we propose an improved fast reroute scheme called “relaxed MRC” (rMRC). rMRC achieves the same level of protection as MRC without requiring that all links are isolated, which results in less constrained routing and has two important implications:

- First, multi-topology routing allows independent setting of link weights in the logical topologies. This implies that traffic can be routed according to a different set of link weights during the recovery phase than during normal operation, allowing independent traffic engineering for each topology. A careful tuning of the link weights in the logical backup topologies can improve the load distribution in the network after a failure has been encountered [14]. We expect rMRC to further improve this ability.

- Second, existing proactive recovery schemes are designed to guarantee recovery from single failures only. However, several studies show that multiple simultaneous failures are not uncommon in practice, and that in most cases there is a correlation between the elements that fail together [10], [15]. Such failures are often said to belong to a common shared risk group (SRG). Examples of common failure correlations include IP links sharing the same conduct, fiber, network card, or router. The cause of correlated failures can be natural disasters, terror attacks, power outages or construction workers accidentally breaking a fiber conduct [16]. The relaxed structure of rMRC makes it flexible enough to develop practical algorithms for fast recovery from SRG failures, provided that the topology remains connected.

This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we provide additional background and related work in IP FRR and network load optimizations. In Sec. III we present our relaxed recovery scheme. The performance evaluation of rMRC including load distribution for the single fault situation is presented in Sec. IV. In Sec. V we describe and evaluate an extension to rMRC for handling shared risk group failures. We also compare this scheme with the most viable existing fast reroute schemes. We conclude the article in Sec. VI.

II. BACKGROUND

IP fast reroute should provide full protection against all single link and node failures in the network. The IETF IP FRR framework [5] distinguishes between different recovery schemes for use in IP networks. The simplest scheme is fast failure protection using Loop-Free Alternates (LFA, [6]). In case of failure, LFA redirects traffic to neighboring nodes which have a path to the destination that does not include the failed component. The simplest case is when there are one or more equal cost alternate paths from the detecting node to the destination (Equal-Cost Multi-Path forwarding, ECMP). ECMP can be used both for load balancing and failure recovery.

LFA is simple to implement and already available, but does not guarantee 100% failure recovery for single link and node failures [17]. Therefore, LFA is rather a short-term solution and IP-FRR schemes with 100% failure coverage are required for the future. In addition to the scheme that we improve in this paper, reference [5] points at tunneling using Not-Via Addresses [7] and Interface Specific Forwarding (FIFR) [8] as the most viable ones. Any of these can be used as a complement to LFA, or alone.

Not-via operates similarly to MPLS fast reroute where the router detecting a failure tunnels the packets to the router after the failed component in the forwarding path. The semantics of a Not-via address are that a packet addressed to a Not-via address must be delivered to the router with that address, not via the neighboring router. All routers calculate shortest paths to each Not-via address without using the router which the address is supposed to protect.

FIFR utilizes the fact that forwarding tables are stored on each interface, and calculates different forwarding information for each interface. Routers will then decide the next hop for a packet based on destination address and incoming interface. With this approach it is possible to recover from any single failure. However, since FIFR does not rely on packet marking, dropping packets that are looping is not supported. This may be a problem when there are multiple failures in the network.

An important challenge when designing fast reroute schemes is to minimize the adverse consequences on the backup paths and traffic distribution [18]. Network operators often carefully configure their networks to avoid overloaded links. The shifting of traffic to alternate links after a failure can lead to congestion and packet loss in parts of the network [19]. This can be the case both while the fast-reroute is active and, in case of permanent failure, after the re-convergence process. Appropriate link weight settings can mitigate the packet loss in all phases.

To avoid congestion while traffic is being recovered by rMRC, we use load balancing techniques developed in a traffic engineering context. The first traffic engineering mechanisms for connectionless IP networks were based on finding a set of link weights that distributes the load on the available links in the network given an estimate of the traffic demands [20], [21]. Later, more robust methods have been developed that also take into account variations in the traffic demands [22] or link failures [23], [24]. In MT-based recovery schemes, load can be distributed during the recovery phase as well [14].

In [25], the authors propose to use a concept similar to MT routing to achieve increased path diversity and increased robustness. They present a method to randomly generate alternate topologies, and a way for the source node to assign traffic to each of them. Their method does not guarantee recovery from all single failures, and the recovery time is longer than in other FRR schemes due to signaling delay.

Most work on correlated failures has focused on shared risk link group recovery in optical WDM networks and networks running GMPLS or MPLS (e.g., [26]). Another related
research topic concentrates on tools for correlated failure diagnosis (e.g., [27]). A method for fast recovery from any two concurrent (not correlated) failures is described in [28]. The scalability of this scheme is probably too poor for practical applications, and it is not covering shared risk groups of size larger than two.

Related to the fast reroute approaches described above is the issue of avoiding transient loops during the re-convergence phase after a topology change. Solutions for this problem have been proposed both for current link-state routing protocols [29], and a more general solution that can work with any routing protocol [30]. Solutions have also been proposed to avoid packet loss during planned disruptions in BGP sessions [31].

III. RELAXED MRC

The core idea of MRC and rMRC is to have different backup routing topologies in which certain nodes and links are not used for the routing of recovered traffic. If a link or node fails, traffic can still be forwarded in its corresponding backup topology. The node detecting that the next hop for a packet is not reachable in its current topology just needs to switch the traffic to another still working routing topology.

MRC as presented in [9] creates a set of backup topologies so that each link and node in the network is isolated in one of them. Relaxed MRC (rMRC) removes the requirement that each link must be isolated in a backup topology, and uses the isolated links only when strictly necessary. We now describe the internal structure of the backup topologies in rMRC, present an algorithm that can create them, and describe the forwarding mechanism in the network nodes.

A. Definitions

We consider a network consisting of a set of nodes V and links E defined by the network topology graph $G = (V, E)$. In IP networks, unidirectional links (edges) $e = (u, v)$ are assigned link weights $w(e)$. Traffic is carried over the paths with the least cumulative link weights to its destination. With MT routing, a logical topology $T_i$ is defined by assigning various link weights $w_i(e)$ to all links $e \in E$ such that each topology can have a different routing.

Let $w_{\text{max}}$ be the maximal normal link weight in the network, i.e., $1 \leq w(e) \leq w_{\text{max}}, \forall e \in E$. We define $w_r = |E| \cdot w_{\text{max}}$ as the restricted link weight. The purpose of restricted links is to influence where shortest paths are laid in backup topologies—any acyclic path consisting of edges $e : w(e) \leq w_r$ in the network will have a cumulative weight lower than the weight of a single restricted link. Finally, we refer to a link with infinite weight as an isolated link.

An rMRC network topology $T_i$ comprises the graph $G$ and a weight function $w_i : E \rightarrow \{1, 2, \ldots, w_{\text{max}}, w_r, \infty\}$. rMRC distinguishes between the default topology $T_0$ and backup topologies $T_i, i > 0$. In $T_0$ no links are restricted, i.e., $w_0(e) \leq w_{\text{max}}, \forall e \in E$.

For the protection against all single node failures, each node $v \in V$ must not be used as a transit node in at least one routing topology $T_i$. Then, we say that $v$ is an isolated node in topology $T_i$. Formally, a node $v \in V$ is isolated in topology $T_i$ if and only if all its adjacent links have a weight of at least $w_r$. In rMRC, only links directly connecting two isolated nodes must be assigned an infinite weight and thus be isolated themselves. This is necessary to prevent traffic (i.e., shortest paths) from ever going through an isolated node. Isolated nodes must be placed in backup topologies so that the following invariant holds:

Invariant 1: All nodes must be connected by a path consisting only of non-isolated links and nodes. This ensures that all nodes can reach each other in all backup topologies without transiting an isolated node.

Fig. 1a and 1b give an example of a typical backup topology for MRC (a) and rMRC (b) where nodes 3, 4 and 5 are isolated, and hence they will not transit any traffic. The links attached to these nodes have the weight $w_r$ or infinity, which ensures that a shortest path routing algorithm will not select a path over these nodes. The example illustrates that rMRC (b) requires fewer isolated links (bold-line links) than MRC (a).

B. Backup Topology Construction

rMRC and MRC can guarantee recovery from any link or node failure only in biconnected topologies. If the topology is single-connected, one could decompose it in the biconnected components and create backup topologies for each of them.

Backup topologies may be constructed using different methods. Manual construction is possible for smaller topologies, or
Algorithm 1: Basic rMRC backup topology generator.

Input: Desired number of backup topologies $n$, graph $G$
Output: Backup topologies $T_1, \ldots, T_n$, if successful

1 for $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ do
2 $T_i \leftarrow (G, w_0)$ // Backup topology $i$
3 $S_i \leftarrow \emptyset$ // Isolated nodes in $T_i$
4 end
5 $Q_n \leftarrow V(G)$ // Node queue
6 $i \leftarrow 1$
7 while $Q_n \neq \emptyset$ do
8 $u \leftarrow$ first ($Q_n$)
9 $j \leftarrow i$
10 repeat
11 if connected($T_j$, $u$) then
12 $S_j \leftarrow S_j \cup \{u\}$
13 else
14 $j \leftarrow (j \mod n) + 1$
15 until $u \in S_j$ or $i = j$
16 // If $i = j$, all backup topologies tried
17 if $u \notin S_i$ then
18 Abort execution
19 $i \leftarrow (i \mod n) + 1$
20 end

Procedure isolate($u$, $T_j$)

1 forall $(u, v) \in E(G)$ do
2 if $w_j(u, v) = w_t$ then
3 $w_j(u, v) \leftarrow \infty$
4 else
5 $w_j(u, v) \leftarrow w_t$
6 end

one could easily construct algorithms that isolate one or few nodes per backup topology.

Since the amount of the state required in the routers grows with the number of backup topologies, algorithms that create few backup topologies and still guarantee recovery from any link or node failure are particularly interesting. The first question one will pose is what is the minimal number of backup topologies required to give such a guarantee for a given input topology. This problem is proved to be NP-complete, and is difficult to handle analytically [32]. Instead, greedy heuristic algorithms are commonly used to create a small number of backup topologies that guarantee recovery from any link or node failure, like the algorithm presented in [9].

For rMRC, we present a simple heuristic algorithm that attempts to isolate approximately even nodes in each of a given number of backup topologies (Alg. 1). The algorithm initially creates backup topologies as copies of the default topology $(G, w_0)$, without any isolated nodes. In this algorithm, node queue $Q_n$ is created as an arbitrary sequence (line 5).

The algorithm tries to isolate nodes as they are pulled out of the node queue (line 8). The backup topologies are selected in round-robin fashion (line 15). Function connected($T_i$, $u$) tests if node $u$ can be isolated in topology $T_i$ without violating Invariant 1 (Sec. III-A). For example, if node 1 was the next node to be tested in the backup topology depicted in Fig. 1b, the test would return false. This is because node 4 then lacks a path of non-isolated nodes to all other nodes. If node 0 was the next node, the test would return true. In that case, procedure isolate($u$, $T_j$) is called. This procedure alters the weights of the links adjacent to $u$. If a neighbor of $u$ was already isolated, the link between them will get weight $\infty$ (line 3 in the procedure isolate). Else, the link will get the weight $w_r$ (line 5). If connected($T_i$, $u$) returns false, all other backup topologies are tried in sequence.

In some cases the specified number of backup topologies is too low for the input graph $G$, and the algorithm will have to abort and exit without success (line 18).

The complexity of the presented rMRC algorithm for topology creation is, similar to MRC, determined by the loops and the complexity of the connectivity testing. An algorithm that tests whether a network is connected is bound to worst case $O(|V| + |E|)$. The number of runs of the inner loop in Alg. 1 is bound by the maximum node degree $\Delta$. In worst case, we must run through all $n$ configurations to find a configuration where a node can be isolated. The worst case running time for the complete algorithm is then bound by $O(n\Delta|V||E|)$.

While the worst-case running time of the rMRC algorithm is unchanged compared to MRC, the rMRC algorithm is simpler and easier to implement.

C. Forwarding Information Computation

The generated topologies are input to a process that calculates backup next hops. This process is similar to the forwarding information calculation in the default (failure-free) topology. It also finds the shortest paths to all destinations, but differs in the way how it performs the last hop calculation.

Normally, both link and node failures are protected by routing traffic around the next hop node. However, when the last link used to reach the destination (or egress router in the network) fails, only the next hop link should be avoided and not the entire node. This is known as the last hop problem [19] and has to be handled separately.

Contrary to MRC, rMRC does not explicitly isolate all links to solve the last hop problem. Instead, rMRC computes the shortest path without the failed link in the backup topology where the detecting node itself is isolated. Using the backup topology where the detecting node is isolated ensures that the traffic cannot loop back to the detecting node but still enables the rMRC forwarding to reach the destination node.

D. Forwarding

In multi-topology routing, all packets carry a topology identifier to associate them with the topology they are routed in. The topology ID is encoded in the packet header. All nodes have to maintain routing information for all topologies to be able to forward data in any of them. This basic forwarding is shown in steps 1 and 2 in the procedure in Fig. 2.

Failure-detecting nodes have a special role. They have to change the topology the packet is routed in from the default (normal) topology to the appropriate backup topology. Topology change can occur only once; if the packet is already
Fig. 2. rMRC forwarding procedure.

tagged by a backup topology, the packet is dropped to avoid looping in case of multiple failures (step 3). If the failure is detected toward an intermediate node (not last hop) in the forwarding path, the appropriate backup topology is the one that has the failed node isolated. Then, regardless of whether there is a link or node failure that has been detected the packet is rerouted around the failure to the destination.

If the failure is detected on the last hop in the forwarding path, the same next hop can be returned in step 4, and step 5 evaluates to “Yes”. However, since the forwarding information is computed without the link between the detecting node and the destination, it is safe to forward the packet in the backup topology where the detecting node is isolated (step 6).

We illustrate the rMRC last hop handling using Fig. 1. Assume node 6 detects a failure toward the last hop node 3. The rMRC topology where node 3 is isolated is shown in Fig. 1b. Here, path 6-3 has still the lowest cost but must not be selected since link 6-3 (or node 3) has failed. Instead, rMRC uses the topology where the detecting node 6 is isolated (Fig. 1c). In this backup topology, any neighbor of node 6 may be used to reach the destination. It is however favorable to pre-calculate which neighbor is closest to the destination and store this as the next hop in this topology. In our example in Fig. 1c, node 7 is closest to the destination and selected as the backup next hop to destination 3 in this backup topology. Since node 6 itself is isolated in this topology, packets do not loop back to the failed link 6-3.

IV. EVALUATION

Commonly used performance evaluation metrics for IP FRR schemes include routing state increase, backup path lengths, and load distribution. We compare rMRC with MRC to pinpoint the performance differences. A performance evaluation of MRC compared to the other IP FRR schemes like Not-Via and FIFR can be found in [33].

Fault-tolerant multi-topology routing requires the routers to store additional information about the backup topologies. The amount of state required in the routers is related to the number of such backup topologies. An excessive amount of this state may affect router operation and therefore generating only few backup topologies is desirable. We measure how many backup topologies are needed by MRC and rMRC to guarantee fault tolerance.

When the failure occurs, IP FRR will immediately start forwarding data traffic over backup paths. As backup paths already carry their normal (non-rerouted) traffic, this increases the chance of congestion even in networks that are well provisioned for failure-free cases.

The backup path lengths are correlated with the total network load and the end-to-end delay. The backup path lengths are independent of the traffic matrix, yielding more robust results. Therefore we evaluate both the backup path lengths and how well rMRC can optimize the load distribution and avoid congestion in the case of failure.

Evaluation of, e.g., state requirements of a fast reroute scheme requires experimenting with a large number of diverse network topologies, while load distribution optimizations are computationally expensive. We therefore used two evaluation methods, one for the state requirements and backup path lengths, and one for the load distribution evaluation.

A. State Requirements and Backup Path Lengths

1) Method: We used synthetic network topologies based on the Waxman model [34], created using the BRTE generator [35], as well as some publicly available real topologies. Families of 100 networks of size 16–64 nodes and two or three times as many links are tested. We use unit link weights, so that the path lengths equal the hop count. This is the common practice when there is no information on how these weights are set in a given network. The link weights can be set algorithmically to improve the load distribution, as we shall see later in this section.

Algorithms for MRC (as in [9]) and rMRC (Alg. 1, Sec. III) are used to create backup topologies with the minimum number of topologies. For any given topology the algorithms are run with \( n = 2, 3, \ldots \), until the first successful execution. The results of these runs are presented in the state requirements analysis.

Based on the created backup topologies, we measure the backup path lengths (hop count) achieved by our schemes after a node failure. The backup path lengths are calculated for each source-destination pair in the network and for each node failure on the path between them.

2) State Requirements: Relaxed backup topologies defined and described in Sec. III do not isolate all links. Therefore, there is more flexibility in rMRC than in MRC to decrease the number of backup topologies. Figure 1 illustrates this difference. Assume that the process of isolating nodes (and links for MRC) should continue from the topologies presented for MRC (Fig. 1a) and rMRC (Fig. 1b). For MRC, nodes 1, 2
and 7 are not candidates to be isolated, because isolating any of them would disconnect one or more of nodes 4, 5 and 3 from the rest of the topology. For rMRC, it is only node 1 that must be excluded from the list of candidates, since its isolation would lead to disconnection of node 4.

Figure 3 and Tab. I show the number of backup topologies generated with the MRC and rMRC. We observe that the increased flexibility with rMRC can decrease the number of topologies needed, in both denser (D=3) and sparser (D=2) topologies.

3) Path Lengths: Since routing in a backup topology is restricted, MRC and rMRC result in backup paths that are equally long or longer than the optimal paths in the re-converged network.

Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of path lengths for normal failure-free routing, IP re-convergence, MRC and rMRC during a node failure in networks with 32 nodes and 64 links (other network sizes show the same tendency). We see that the performance of less constrained rMRC is slightly better than the performance of MRC and closer to the optimal full IP re-convergence. It is important to remember that IP FRR gives that performance immediately after the failure is detected, while the optimal scheme does not yield this until the re-convergence is completed.

Mean path lengths for different network sizes are shown in Fig. 5. As the size of the networks increases the path lengths also increase. Still, rMRC shows a better performance compared to MRC. In Fig. 6, we show how the number of backup topologies influences the backup path lengths for MRC and rMRC in topologies with 32 nodes and 64 links. Increasing the number of backup topologies to a few more than the minimum achievable improves the performance. However, the improvement diminishes if the number of backup topologies reaches a certain level.

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Nodes</th>
<th>Links</th>
<th>MRC</th>
<th>rMRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geant</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost239</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFN</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Network Load Distribution

1) Method: When the rMRC fast reroute is active in the network, the load distribution during recovery depends on three factors:

1) The link weight assignment used in the default (normal) topology,
2) The structure of the backup topologies (i.e., which links and nodes are isolated in each of them),

**Fig. 3.** CDF of the number of backup topologies for MRC and rMRC calculated for 100 random Waxman topologies with 32 nodes and two or three times as many links (32-2 and 32-3, respectively).

**Fig. 4.** Path length distribution.

**Fig. 5.** Mean path length as function of the network size.

**Fig. 6.** Mean path length as function of the number of backup topologies. All networks have 32 nodes and 64 links. “Min” means the minimal number of backup topologies achieved by our algorithm for the given input topology; typically 3 or 4.
3) The link weight assignments used in the normal links \((w(e) \leq w_{\text{max}})\) of the backup topologies.

The link weights in the default topology (1) are important since all non-affected traffic is distributed according to them, while backup topologies are used only for the traffic affected by the failure. The backup topology structure (2) dictates which links are used in the recovery paths for each failure. The backup topology link weight assignments (3) determine which among the available backup paths are actually used.

The load distribution in the network (1) and (3) can be improved using IP link weight optimization techniques. The optimization process modifies the link weights trying to reduce the utilization of the link with the highest traffic load subject to the given source-destination traffic matrix.

There are different approaches regarding the question whether IP link weights should be optimized primarily for the load distribution in the failure-free case or for the fast reroute phase (in which case some of the failure-free performance may be lost). This mainly depends on the network operators’ management policies. Fault-tolerant multi-topology routing allows link weight settings in the backup topologies independent from the default topology. This allows us to optimize the failure free phase and improve the fast reroute load balancing.

We use ECMP forwarding to further improve the load distribution. Since this implies the existence of this mechanism in the routers, we also use ECMP for fast reroute in cases an alternate equal-cost path is available after failure [6]. (r)MRC is then only used when there is no such equal cost alternate.

a) Considered Network Topologies: For the computationally demanding load distribution optimizations, we use several realistic network topologies, and present results for Geant and Cost239 networks. Geant is an illustrative existing network, while Cost239 is a good representative of a projected topology that shows how the future networks should look like to properly support resilience mechanisms and fault management. This is reflected among other things in the network connectivity, Geant being relatively sparse compared to Cost239 (Fig. 7).

b) Optimization Framework: Network operators often plan and configure their network based on an estimate of the traffic demands from each ingress node to each egress node. Clearly, the knowledge of such a demand matrix provides the opportunity to construct the backup topologies in a way that gives better load balancing and avoids congestion after a failure.

In this paper we optimize the load distribution for MRC and rMRC using the same three-step procedure:

1) The link weights in the normal topology are optimized for the given demand matrix while only taking the failure free situation into account.

2) To construct backup topology “intelligently”, the load distribution in the failure free case is used. We calculate the impact of each node failure on the load on the remaining links in the network. The aim is to isolate nodes that carry a large amount of transit traffic in the backup topologies with good connectivity. Thus, if such a node fails, there are many possible recovery paths, leading to a larger optimization potential. To that purpose, [14] describes a heuristic that sums up the total transit traffic through each node and isolates fewer heavy-traffic nodes, or more light-traffic nodes, per backup topology.

3) When the backup topologies are constructed, the link weights (for links where \(w(e) \leq w_{\text{max}}\)) of the backup topologies are optimized to get a good load distribution after any link or node failure.

For a clear comparison, we compare backup topologies with identical isolated node sets for MRC and rMRC. The backup topologies are constructed using the algorithm described in [9]. In rMRC, the isolated link weights are relaxed to \(w_t\) except between the isolated nodes, as described in Sec. III-A.

c) Traffic Matrix: To evaluate the load distribution in the network, we require the knowledge of the traffic matrix. The structure of the matrix directly influences the link weight setting given by the optimization procedure. Thus, it is necessary to know the traffic demands between all origin and destination pairs in the network. Even for real networks, this data is generally unavailable due to its confidentiality and difficulties in collecting it. We chose to synthesize the origin-destination (OD) flow data by drawing exponentially distributed OD demand values and matching these values with the OD pairs according to the heuristic described in [36]. In short, we sort the OD pairs according to their node degree and the likelihood of one of them being used as the backup node in the case of a single link failure. Then, we match the sorted OD pair list with the sorted list of demand intensities generated using the gravity model, which is suited for this purpose [37]. The generated OD matrix is scaled so that the most loaded link in the failure-free case has 100% utilization.

d) Optimization Method: The traffic distribution in a network can be measured in terms of maximum link utilization and groomed by appropriate link weight settings. We use an optimization method based on a simulated annealing-like principle [38]. In this paragraph, we formalize our optimization objectives.

We represent the link weights for topology \(T_i\) by a vector \(w_i\) with one entry for each link (edge) \(e \in E\). Given the link weight vector \(w_0\) for the default topology \(T_0\), we evaluate the link utilization \(\rho(e, w_0)\) on all links \(e \in E\) in the network during the failure-free case. This yields our objective function for optimization step (1) from above:

![Fig. 7. Cost239 topology (a) and Geant topology (b) used in the evaluation.](image-url)
minimize $\rho_{\text{max}}(w_0) = \max_{e \in E} (\rho(e, w_0))$ \hspace{1cm} (1)

The algorithm implemented by our software heuristically searches the vector space of possible link weight vectors $w_0$ as described in [38].

Given the backup topologies $T_i (i = 1, \ldots, n)$ with their link weights $w_i$ and the link weight vector $w_0$ for default topology $T_0$, we can now evaluate the link utilization $\rho^{w_0}(e, s, w)$ for link $e \in E$ in failure scenario $s \in S$, where $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_n)$ are the link weights vectors for the backup topologies. The set $S$ hereby denotes the set of protected network element failure scenarios, e.g., all single link and node failures, and does not contain the failure-free case. Note that during failure scenario $s$ the nodes adjacent to the failure send traffic over appropriate backup topologies according to MRC or rMRC. Thus, $\rho^{w_0}(e, s, w)$ is composed of the link utilization in the individual topologies $T_i$ where the routing follows $w_i$. This yields our objective function for optimization step (3) from above:

minimize $\rho_{\text{max}}^{w_0,E,s}(w) = \max_{e \in E, s \in S} (\rho^{w_0}(e, s, w))$ \hspace{1cm} (2)

subject to the condition that the weights of restricted and isolated links may not be changed. The heuristic again searches the space of possible link weight vectors for backup topologies $T_i$ where $w_0$ for the default topology remains fixed.

2) Results: We present the load distribution for the tested networks in form of the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF), since this type of graph clearly shows the difference between different methods in the tail of the distribution (i.e., for the most loaded links). If, for example, a CCDF line matches values $x = 0.5$ and $y = 0.68$, this means that 68% of the links have load utilization of 50% or more. The results are scaled so that the link with the highest load in the failure-free case has unit utilization 1.00. We compare the maximum link utilization for the failure-free case, the re-converged network after a failure (but without a new link-optimization process), then for rMRC and finally for the MRC fast reroute.

For all distributions except the failure-free case, the depicted values represent the maximum load a particular link experiences over all failures. Note that in these simulations, we never drop traffic due to congestion. Instead, we let the utilization of some links exceed 100%. Hence, all load values should be considered relative. Figures 8 and 9 shows results for all single link failures (left), and all single link- and node failures (right), scaled so that the highest load in the optimized failure-free case has unit utilization of 1.0.

For Cost239 (Fig. 8), the maximum link utilization for re-converged routing is 1.73. Optimized rMRC has the maximum link utilization of 1.50, while MRC has 1.87 for link failures and 2.03 for node failures. Again, it is important to remember that IP FRR outperforms the re-converged routing immediately after the failure is detected—it does not need to wait for the routing process to converge. One interesting observation is that node failures normally do not give higher maximum link utilization than link failures, since the traffic entering and leaving the network at the failed node is removed.

The results indicate a significantly lower fast reroute load if rMRC is deployed rather than MRC. If we divide all links by traffic load into two equally large groups, the difference is particularly big (up to 35%) for the high-load half, while MRC and rMRC behave similarly for the low-load half. It is interesting that this significant difference is observed despite that in some 60% of the cases nodes select an ECMP alternate for the affected traffic, in which case rMRC or MRC recovery is not used at all.

Fig. 9b shows how rMRC’s ability to spread traffic over more links can sometimes have a dramatic impact in a sparsely connected network topology. After the worst-case node failure in the Geant network, the relative maximum link utilization for re-converged routing and the optimized rMRC is almost the same and lies around 3.42, while the optimized MRC performs poorly with a ratio of 7.76. Analysis of this particular case confirms that the reduced number of isolated links (that can not carry recovered traffic) in rMRC allows traffic to be recovered over more than one path, and makes it possible to set link weights that gives a reduced utilization compared to MRC.

V. MULTIPLE CORRELATED FAILURES

High-quality network equipment is manufactured so that the expected mean time before the given component fails is very long. When failures do happen, the operator quickly replaces the failed component to restore the service. Thus, while any combination of network links and nodes may fail simultaneously, the probability of two independent, simultaneous failures is relatively low.

Many components do however share some physical or system relation, and the likelihood of their simultaneous failure is much higher. A single duct of optical fiber can carry many logical IP connections. A power supply failure may cut out a large set of colocated network nodes. Various other multiple network failures caused by a single event are possible [16]. We call such failures correlated, and they occur frequently in practice [10], [15]. Components that share some kind of failure correlation are said to comprise a Shared Risk Group (SRG).

Relaxed MRC provides a greater flexibility of backup topology creation and opens the door to handle multiple correlated failures with IP FRR. The good news about correlated failures is that they are often possible to anticipate. It is, for example, often known which links share the same duct, or the same interface card on a router. The single failure recovery schemes presented in Sec. III will in some cases be able to recover the traffic from more than one failure, however, they provide no guarantees. A modified rMRC algorithm that takes into account SRGs may yield much better results under multiple simultaneous failures. In this section, we propose and evaluate such an algorithm that we denote rMRC-SRG. We also evaluate the recovery properties of Not-via, FIFR and rMRC, and compare the path lengths of all the schemes.

A. Types of Correlation—Shared Risk Groups

In a large network there is a vast number of combinations of potential failures. It is not scalable or required to design
We focus on the three main causes of correlations observed in fixed IP networks: simultaneous failure of neighboring nodes, links sharing the same network interface card on a router and links sharing the same fiber or conduct [39]. In addition, all links sharing the same router can often be regarded as correlated, however this will be implicitly covered by node recovery in a method for one fault tolerance. We only address components whose failure is possible to protect—we do not attempt to protect SRGs whose removal disconnects the network.

Figure 10a shows the basic principle of a shared risk group of neighbor nodes. Such nodes can fail simultaneously due to power outage or disasters like floods and terror attacks. These nodes are assumed to be located in nearby physical locations and also sharing some physical resources. A point of presence (PoP) could be a typical example. Also regular maintenance like software updates and router restarts might be interpreted as neighboring nodes failing simultaneously.

Figure 10b shows the basic principle of a shared risk group of links sharing the same network interface card on a router. This group definition will also represent links that share the same fiber or conduct attached to the same node. Failures on the interface card, failures on a fiber component or a fiber cut will cause these links to fail simultaneously.

Figure 10c shows the basic principle of a shared risk group of links sharing the same conduct. This type of correlation covers links that do not share an end point (node). A correlation where the links in a conduct also share a node is covered by the shared risk group in Fig. 10b (card).

We make the following assumptions regarding the types of correlation. For the neighbor groups (Fig. 10a), we assume that every node in the group has a connection to a node that is not in the group. Else, it is not possible to guarantee a communication path to a non-failed node in the group in the case where not the entire group has failed. For card groups (Fig. 10b), we assume point-to-point links that can only be in one card group at each end. For conduct groups (Fig. 10c) we assume that a link can be part of more than one group as a link can share conduct with other links in different parts of a conduct stretch.

B. Basic principles of rMRC-SRG

rMRC-SRG is designed to guarantee recovery from any single component failure or any single shared risk group failure that has been planned for in advance. To accomplish this, we build a set of logical backup topologies that make sure that each single node and each SRG has been isolated from
carrying traffic in at least one of the topologies. We use restricted and isolated links and isolated nodes (described in Sec. III-A) as tools to isolate all the components. Since the SRG scheme is based on rMRC, single links do not have to be isolated explicitly. However, we use isolated links to isolate the conduct groups and the card groups.

**Neighbor group:** For each neighbor group, there must exist a backup topology where all the nodes constituting the group are isolated, i.e., the links attached to the nodes are assigned the link weight $w_i$ as described in Sec. III-A. Some of those links might be assigned weight of infinity if they belong to, for instance, a card group (described below) that is isolated in the same backup topology. Links between isolated nodes in a neighbor group will have the weight of infinity too.

**Interface card group:** For each card group, there must exist a backup topology where the links constituting a card group will not carry any traffic. In this backup topology, these links will have the weight of infinity, i.e., they are isolated links.

**Conduct group:** For each conduct group, there must exist a backup topology where the links constituting a conduct group will not carry any traffic. In this backup topology, these links will have the weight of infinity, i.e., they are isolated links.

One backup topology can potentially isolate several nodes, links, and SRGs as long as the Invariant 1 from Sec. III-A holds. Since the SRGs are isolated using isolated nodes and links, the invariant also implies that the path will avoid all components in a group.

### C. rMRC-SRG Algorithm

We have developed an updated version of the rMRC algorithm to create backup topologies while taking into account the existence of SRGs. Similarly to Alg. 1, the new algorithm operates on an arbitrary biconnected network graph. It takes three sets of correlated network components as input: the set of neighbor groups $C_N$, the set of interface card groups $C_I$, and the set of conduct groups $C_C$. For simplicity, the new algorithm (Alg. 3) does not take the desired number of backup topologies as input. Instead, it creates backup topologies as long as there are any non-isolated elements.

Intuitively, there should be a difference in the number of backup topologies required to isolate all SRGs and single nodes in the network graph, depending on which of the sets $C_N$, $C_I$, and $C_C$ are attempted to isolate first. Therefore, Alg. 3 uses an ordered list of SRG sets as its queue structure $Q$ (line 1). Since a node can be isolated using any combination of isolated and restricted links, Alg. 3 first isolates the more restrictive cases of interface cards (line 2) and conducts (line 3). Then, neighbor node SRGs are added, and, finally, all single nodes (line 5). The single nodes are converted in single-element sets to preserve the set-queue semantics of $Q$.

Algorithm 3 processes the entire queue from the first to the last element attempting to isolate all correlated sets in the current backup topology $T_n$ (line 9). In this algorithm the semantics of function $\text{connected}()$ are overloaded to accept a set of components instead of a single node as in Alg. 1. Function $\text{connected}()$ returns false if removal of all network components (link or nodes) specified in set $S$ disconnects the graph $G$, and true if the graph remains connected.

If the graph remains connected, the elements from the component set $S$ are processed one-by-one and isolated depending on their type (line 14). The processed SRG sets are removed from the queue.

### D. Forwarding

When a failure is detected on the next hop, the rMRC forwarding described in Sec. III-D assumes that there is a mapping from the failed link to a backup topology that avoids that link. No such mapping exists in the SRG case, since SRGs may overlap. This means that several backup topologies might need to be checked before finding the one that protects the failed SRG.

The basic idea for rMRC-SRG forwarding is therefore to successively try the topologies from zero to $\text{id}_{\text{MAX}}$ (i.e., the default topology ID to the highest topology ID, Fig. 11). Care must be taken to avoid looping in presence of concurrent failures that cannot be recovered. Since a node can never change the topology ID to a lower topology ID than the current
ID, the algorithm drops the packets when the topology ID has reached the maximal ID (step 3). If the incoming topology ID \( id_{IN} \) is less than \( id_{MAX} \), steps 4 to 6 try successively backup topologies until the \( id_{MAX} \) has been reached or a valid next hop has been found. If a valid next hop has been found, the packet is forwarded to that next hop, marked with the corresponding topology ID (step 5).

If, however, \( id_{MAX} \) has been reached without having a valid next hop, there is a possibility that the failed interface is toward an egress node. In that case, all backup topologies will return the failed interface as next hop. The packets are then forwarded in the backup topology with ID one higher than the topology ID the packet had when it entered the node. As long as there are not more failures than a single link, node or SRG failure, there will exist a backup topology that brings the packets to the correct egress node without looping back to the failed component. If there are more failures than planned for, in the worst case the packets will be dropped when \( id_{MAX} \) is reached.

**E. Evaluation**

When we build backup topologies that protect against correlated failures, it is expected that the number of backup topologies increases due to the number and combinations of components that must be isolated. In addition, we expect the path lengths to increase due to more isolated components in each topology. In this section we will evaluate the scalability and backup path lengths for the rMRC-SRG scheme, comparing it with the single failure schemes rMRC, Not-via and FIFR.

1) **Method:** We experiment on the synthetic Waxman topologies described in Sec. IV and use the tri-connected DFN network in addition.

We specify SRGs in four classes called “Neighbors”, “Card”, “Conduct” and “Combination” and two group sizes, called A and B (Tab. II). The group size denotes the number of components in a group (nodes, links or interfaces). When we evaluate the “Combination” of SRGs, we combine Neighbor groups, Card groups and Conduct groups randomly with equal probability. In the evaluations, we vary the number of SRGs in a network so that they comply with what would be a reasonable number in the networks of interest.

2) **Number of Backup Topologies:** We first measure the number of backup topologies created by Alg. 3 in the synthetic topologies. We present the results in form (minimum, average, maximum) among the 100 topologies in each class.

Table III shows how the different SRG types (neighbors, interface card, conduct) influence the number of backup topologies for rMRC-SRG. We observe that the number is the same for the three different types. For the combination, the number is a bit lower as it is easier to isolate groups of different types in a common backup topology. We also observe that the number of backup topologies increases with the number and size (category B) of groups. The last row in the table shows that the number of backup topologies increases with lower average node degree (i.e., W-32-64 with 4 SRGs of size B as opposed to W-32-96 with the same number and size of SRGs).

Table IV shows the number of backup topologies for rMRC-SRG compared to rMRC that is designed for single failures only. We have used combinations of the three group types since that will be the most relevant scenario in a real network. We observe that rMRC-SRG, which protects against correlated and single failures, requires more backup topologies compared to rMRC. In addition, more shared risk groups require more backup topologies. On the other hand, it is clear that the size of the groups has little influence on the number of backup topologies needed. This is due to the structure of the different shared risk groups. The size of a card group does not have an influence since the isolated links are attached to the same node and can easily be isolated in the same backup topology no matter whether the size is 2 or 4. Neighbor groups consist of nodes located together, and isolating 5 neighbors instead of 3 neighbors should not influence much the connectivity of the rest of the network. Isolating links does not influence so much the number of backup topologies, since isolated links are less likely to disconnect the network than isolated nodes, particularly when the average node degree is high. Hence, the size of a conduct group has no significant influence on the number of backup topologies. We also see the same tendencies for the DFN network.

3) **Recovery Success Rates:** rMRC-SRG guarantees recovery from planned SRG failures. To motivate the need of this scheme, we give here an evaluation of the success rates of the single failure schemes (rMRC, Not-via and FIFR) during correlated failures. For the evaluation of correlated

![Diagram](image-url)
failures, we used combination of the three group types with the group sizes B (Tab. II). We measured the percentage of source-destination pairs that still can reach each other after having experienced at least one of the failures. For each network type, we have used five randomly generated topologies, and the figures given are the average of those five.

Table V shows the single failure schemes do not provide sufficient recovery guarantees during correlated failures. The number of groups is denoted as "g=x". We have observed the same tendencies for networks of different sizes and node degrees. rMRC-SRG provides 100% protection in all networks. We observe that FIFR gives higher success rate than the other schemes. This is due to the fact that FIFR does not drop packets when a packet experience more than one failure, which is the case with rMRC and Not-via. This has the negative effect that packets that cannot be recovered will loop in the network.

We now turn our attention to how the presented schemes perform in the face of uncorrelated failures. We have generated random simultaneous failures of 2 and 3 nodes and counted the cases where the schemes successfully recover the connectivity (only failure combinations where the network remains connected are counted). Table VI shows the results from a random Waxman topology with 32 nodes and 96 links.

We observe that rMRC-SRG gives higher success rate than the single failure schemes. The advantage is particularly large for 3 failures. The good performance of rMRC-SRG can be explained by three functional properties. First, rMRC-SRG can try all topologies before dropping packets. Second, it requires more topologies than rMRC, and hence have more topologies to choose from. Third, rMRC-SRG isolates more components in each topology to handle the correlations and their combinations. As for correlated failures FIFR performs better than rMRC and Not-via due to no dropping of packets.

4) Backup Path Lengths: We have calculated the difference in path lengths in a scenario with one node failure in the network. There are two reasons for studying the one-failure case. First, the proposed recovery scheme (rMRC-SRG) isolates several components in each backup topology, and hence the routing flexibility is restricted even if there is only one failure in the network. Second, the one-failure case is the most dominant case in practice [10].

Figure 12 gives the results from a random Waxman topology with 32 nodes and 96 links. It shows the CDF of path lengths.
cation and enhancement of conventional MRC in the sense that the requirements for the backup topologies are relaxed. We have explained the basic operation, the backup topology creation, and the link weight optimization that are applicable to MRC and rMRC. Using these algorithms, we compared the performance of the new rMRC to the one of MRC, normal IP re-convergence, and failure-free IP routing.

The results showed that the relaxed requirements of the rMRC have several benefits. The presented algorithm can guarantee link and node fault tolerance with fewer backup topologies than MRC. Furthermore, rMRC increases the connectivity of the backup topologies, so that the length of the backup paths is shortened and the link utilization in failure cases is lower due to improved load distribution. Our evaluation clearly indicates that rMRC is the superior multi-topology routing based approach for IP fast reroute today.

We have presented and evaluated an rMRC variant that protects shared risk groups in addition to single nodes and links. We have described a modified topology generation algorithm and a new forwarding scheme. We have compared this scheme with rMRC and two other well known single failure fast reroute schemes, Not-via and FIFIR. The evaluation has shown that the multi-failure support does still keep the number of backup topologies and path lengths within acceptable bounds while guaranteeing recovery from the specified SRG failures.

From the authors’ perspective rMRC represents the final stage in evolution of practical schemes for multi-topology based IP fast reroute. Further research on this topic may receive inspiration from our results indicating that sparser network recovery using multiple routing configurations, Not-via and FIFIR. We believe this in conjunction with link weight optimizations could further improve the load distribution.

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Matthias Hartmann studied computer science and mathematics at the University of Wuerzburg (Germany), the University of Texas at Austin (USA), and at the Simula Research Laboratory (Norway). He received his diploma degree in computer science in 2007. Currently, he is a researcher at the Institute of Computer Science in Wuerzburg and pursuing his PhD. His current research focuses on IP Fast Reroute and future internet routing in combination with performance evaluation and resilience analysis.

Rüdiger Martin studied computer science and mathematics at SUNY Albany/New York and Wuerzburg/Germany from where he received his diploma degree in computer science in 2003. Since then he is a researcher at the Department of Distributed Systems at the University of Wuerzburg and pursuing his PhD. His research focus is on load balancing mechanisms, load models for capacity overprovisioning, and analysis of resilience mechanisms in communication networks. He received several IEEE best paper awards.

Michael Menth studied computer science and mathematics at the University of Wuerzburg/Germany and Austin/Texas. He worked at the University of Ulm/Germany and Wuerzburg and obtained his PhD in 2004. Currently, he is assistant professor and heading the research group "Next Generation Networks" at the Institute of Computer Science in Wuerzburg. His special interests are performance analysis, optimization of communication networks, resource management, resilience issues, and Future Internet. Dr. Menth holds numerous patent applications and received various scientific awards for innovative work.

Stein Gjessing received his Dr. Philos. degree in 1985, and is currently a professor of Computer Science in Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, and an adjunct researcher at Simula Research Laboratory. His original work was in the field object oriented concurrent programming. He has worked with computer interconnects (Scalable Coherent Interface (IEEE Std. 1596) and LAN/MANs (Resilient Packet Ring (IEEE Std. 802.17)). His main research interests are currently within network resilience, including sensor networks, Internet-like networks and optical networks.

Olav Lysne is Research Director at Simula Research Laboratory, and professor in computer science at Simula Research Laboratory and the University of Oslo. He received the Masters degree in 1988 and Dr. Scient. degree in 1992, both at the University of Oslo. The early research contributions of Lysne were in the field of algebraic specification and term rewriting. However, his most important scientific contributions are in interconnection networks, focusing on problems like effective routing, fault tolerance and Quality of Service. In this area he has participated in numerous program committees, and he served as general chair of ICPP 2005. Lysne is a member of the IEEE.

Amund Kvalbein received his Cand. Scient degree from the University of Oslo in 2003, and his PhD degree from the same institution in 2007. The focus of his PhD was mechanisms for fast recovery from failures in IP networks. In particular, he was central in the development of "Multiple Routing Configurations", which is a method for local, proactive recovery with traditional intra-domain routing protocols. He is now working as a Post Doc at Simula Research Laboratory in Oslo, where he leads the REPAIR research project focusing on resilience in IP networks. From September 2007 to August 2008, he is a visiting researcher at the College of Computing at Georgia Institute of Technology, where he works with reliability and scalability issues in both intra-domain and inter-domain routing.

Tarik Ćićić received the M.S. degree and the Ph.D. degree from the University of Oslo, Norway, in 1997 and 2002 respectively. He has been a postdoctoral fellow at Simula Research Laboratory, Norway, 2003–2007. Today he is the CTO of Media Network Services, Norway, and an associated professor at the Department of Informatics, University of Oslo. His research interests include network architectures, communication protocols modeling, network measurements, and network resilience.

Audun Fosselie Hansen received his M.Sc. degree from the University of Oslo in 2001, and his PhD degree from the same university in 2007. His PhD work focused on resilient routing in IP networks. Since 2001, Hansen has also held a position at Telenor R&D. He is currently leading a research collaboration between Simula Research Laboratory and Telenor R&D. The focus of this research is increased quality and availability for wireless terminals in heterogeneous access networks, including cognitive networks.

Michael Hansen received his M.Sc. degree from the University of Oslo in 2003, and his PhD degree from the same institution in 2007. His PhD work focused on resilient routing in IP networks. Since 2001, Hansen has also held a position at Telenor R&D. He is currently leading a research collaboration between Simula Research Laboratory and Telenor R&D. The focus of this research is increased quality and availability for wireless terminals in heterogeneous access networks, including cognitive networks.

Amund Kvalbein received his Cand. Scient degree from the University of Oslo in 2003, and his PhD degree from the same institution in 2007. The focus of his PhD was mechanisms for fast recovery from failures in IP networks. In particular, he was central in the development of "Multiple Routing Configurations", which is a method for local, proactive recovery with traditional intra-domain routing protocols. He is now working as a Post Doc at Simula Research Laboratory in Oslo, where he leads the REPAIR research project focusing on resilience in IP networks. From September 2007 to August 2008, he is a visiting researcher at the College of Computing at Georgia Institute of Technology, where he works with reliability and scalability issues in both intra-domain and inter-domain routing.